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Abstract
Much of the existing development literature follows 'McKinnon and Shaw
in claiming that higher time deposit rates raise output and lower inflation in
the short run and increase growth via their favourable impact on savings
rates. In this paper we show that this result depends crucially on the
assumption that the portfolio shift into Timne Deposits comes out of an
unproductive asset, providing less intermediation than the banking system.
We show that if instead TD's are closer substitutes to assets providing more
intermediation (such as loans outstanding on the curbmarket) raising TD rates
is contractionary. We further look at the impact of changes in TD rates on
inflation, capital accumulation and medium term growth. We show that a
negative impact on investment and growth and positive effects on inflation in
the short run are possible consequences of increased TD rates. The empirical
relevance of all this is demonstrated by simulation runs with a quarterly
macro-economic model of South Korea.
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Working Paper
Section 1
Establishing high time deposit rates has become a standard part
of the policy advice given to LDCs by external experts, ranging from the
visiting academic economist via the World Bank to emissaries of the IMF. The
rationale behind this advice goes back to an eloquent be it occasionally vague
analysis presented by R. McKinnon in his well known book on financial inter-
mediation and economic development, McKinnon (5), and a similar book by E.
Shaw (8). Their argument rests on the assumption that higher TD rates will
increase the savings rate. If one goes on to assume that LDCs are in a
neoclassical type situation, where investment equals whatever is left over
from total output after consumption has taken its share, the conclusion
follows. McKinnon has added an additional argument, which points to the
importance of financial intermediation. Higher time deposit rates will, so
the story goes, lead to an influx of deposits into commercial banks. This
"raises the real size of the banking system and
hence the net flow of real bank credit to finance investment," to quote Kapur
(4). 2/ This, again, should help long run growth. Kapur does on to argue
that the increased availability of funds for working capital purposes will
I/ High compared to anticipated inflation.
2/ Kapur refers in this quote to investment in working capital. Via his
assumption of a fixed proportion between fixed and working capital, the
statement also applies to fixed capital formation (as is confirmed by his
dynamic analysis). Note by the way the stock/flow confusion embedded in
his statement.
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also increase output and so reduce inflationary pressure given aggregate
demand.
It is this body of theory that has led to the almost universal
acceptance amongst those concerned with Development Economics of the
beneficial effects of increases in TD rates on ouitput and growth. short run
consequences are usually not taken into account, nor their possible conflict
with the professed long run targets. Local economists in LDCs, who cannot
afford to ignore these problems, have mostly resisted the rcommended
policies. As a result, a McKinnon-style stabilization policy (an increase in
time deposit rates coupled with tight money growth rules) has to my knowledge
never been implemented. _/
However, the results obtained by McKinnon/Kapur depend crucially on
one hidden assumption on asset market structulre, an assumption that is never
stated explicitly: all these authors assume that the portfolio shift into
T)'s is coming out of an "unproductive" asset like gold, cash, commodity
stocks, etc.
This seems an overly drastic simplification of the financial
structujre of most LflCs. Official commercial paper or other primary securities
markets are usually in their infancy (with some Latin American exceptions),
but in most countries there are flourishing Unorganized Money Markets, UMM,
where the public can lend directly to firms or farmers. The existence of such
an alternative asset, providing more rather than less intermediation than the
banking system, may change the conclusions drastically. It is not at all
1/ Not even in Korea in 1965, one of the more celebrated monetary reforms.
Large capital inflows associated with an opening up of the capital market
a few months before the interest rate reform were allowed to feed into the
money supply, making for an essentially accommodating monetary policy.
obvious that TDs are closer substitutes to cash, gold, etc., rather than to
loans extended on the curb markets. Nevertheless, this assumption is always
made in this literature, albeit invariably implicitly. Tobin has been arguing
many times more than ten years ago that assumptions like this are of crucial
importance in determining the effects of monetary policy.
In the first part of this paper we explicitly formulate the
portfolio allocation problem faced by wealthholders in a model that provides a
more realistc description of financial markets in LDCs. The public can either
hold cash, TDs, or curb market loans. The model is closed by a simple
Keynesian fixed price output determination mechanism. We analyze the
portfolio shifts that will occur when rTD changes, and the implications they
have for the impact of changes in TD rates on economic activity.
In Section 3 of this working paper we go beyond the Tobin-style
analysis and look at the impact of changes in Time Deposit rates on inflation,
capital accumulation and medium term growth, integrating the simplified
analysis of the first part in a medium term growth model. The model used
there stresses not only the portfolio structu-re analyzed in Part 1, but also
the importance of the link between monetary policy and the aggregate supply
curve via credit-financing of working capital. Recently, several authors have
found that incorporating this institutional detail characteristic of many LT)Cs
has unusual consequences for the link between monetary policy and inflation
(Cavallo (3), Bruno (2) or van Wijabergen (13)).
We will show that taking these institutional characteristics typical
for LDCs into account does lead to unorthodox results. A "traditional"
analysis of inflation would simply add an expectation augmented Philips curve
to the model of Part 1, and come up with the straightforward result that
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higher time deposit rates will increase or slowdown inflation depending on
whether they have an expansionary effect on economic activity or not. As we
will see below, incorporating the influeace of real curb market rates on the
cost of financing working capital and from there on prices, drastically
changes these results. A further victim of our analysis is the optimistic
McKinnon view that higher TD rates (whatever their short run impact) will lead
to higher growth. If an increase in TD rates raises the real curb market
rate, it may slow down the growth rate, the higher savings rate out of income
not withstanding. A condition under which this is bound to happen is derived
and analyzed.
To indicate the empirical relevance of these phenomena I have run a
few simulations with a model of the Korean economy that incorporates the
financial structure outlined before (for a full description of the model see
van Wijnbergen (14)). The model is described briefly in Section 4. The
simulation results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Section 2
TIME DEPOSIT RATES, BANK LENDING RATES AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY:
A SIMPLIFIED SHORT RIJN MODEL
In this section we will present a simplified model focusing mainly
on asset markets and the substLitution effects generated there by changes in
interest rates. The real sector is modeled by a sitmple Keynesian, demand
determined, output mechanism. In the next section inflation and LR
considerations will be brought in.
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The public is assumed to allocate its wealth over currency, time
deposits and loans in the curb markets, taking into account the rate of
returns on these three assets (minus the inflation rate - p , the real time
A A
deposit rate rTD - p and the real curb market rate i - p , real income y and
real wealth W. 1/2/
The allocation is described by a Tobin-type portfolio model where we
impose unit wealth elasticities for simplicity:
(a) C = fc(P, i, rTD, y)W
(1) TD = fTD(P, i, rTD' y)W
(c) L umm f MM(p, i, rTD, y)W
where IJMM refers to the curb market (Unorganized Money Market) and with the
usual adding up conditions applying to these demand functions:
(la) y f' = 0, fi = 1
A subscript j indicates a partial derivative with respect to
argument j. Further, we impose the gross-substitute assumption, demand
functions have positive derivatives with respect to their own rate of return,
1/ In this section p is still considered exogenous. p will be
"endogenized" in Section 3.
2/ What really matters is the existence of a group of assets more
"productive" (i.e., leading to more pass-through into capital) than
time deposits, and a less "productive" group. Whether the latter
consists of cash, gold or commodity stocks is really not relevant.
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but negative with respect to the rate of return on the two alternative
assets. Finally, it is a well established empirical fact that currency and
time deposits holdings are positively related to income; this implies via the
consistency conditions (la) that the supply ofcurb market loans depends
negatively on income:
(lb) fTTMM < O
y
By assumption, banks have as their only source of funds private Time Deposits
against which they arerequird to hold reserves at a rate p. They allocate the
remainder of their assets over free reserves and loans depending on the
inflation rate and the bank lending rate rL I so their supply of loans (in
real terms) becomes:
(2) LSDMB = b(P, rL)(l - p)TD; 0 < b < 1
Finally, firms are supposed to snap up every loan the commercial
banks are willing to make, as they are offered at below market interest
rates. The remaider of their credit needs is met by the curb market. They
need credtt to finance working capital (fixed capital is brought in the next
section); the need for working capital depends positively on the real product
wage and output:
(3) Df = Df(w, y) Df > °
where Df is the business sector's demand for working capital in real terms.
-9-
If we put all this in a Tobin-type accounting framework, we get
Chart 1
DEMAND SUPPLY
Asset Hol
ders Public Banks Firms
Assets
Currency fc i, r y)W + pTD + (l-b(P,rL))(l-p)TD MR
Time Deposit fTD(P, i, rTD y)W _ TD < O
UMMM f (P, i, rTD,y)W + b(P, rL)(l-P)TD - Df(w, y) 0
Where MR is the monetary base in real terms and TDS the supply of Time
Deposits by banks (also in real terms).
Chart 1 incorporates in the TD-row the assumption that Time Deposit
rate ceilings throw banks off their supply curve TDS and make TD's demand
determined. With TO determined by demand, we are left with te market clearing
equation for the monetary base MR and for the curb market. UJsing the various
balance sheet constraints with which the public, banks and firms are faced, it
is easy to show that equilibrium in the I1M implies equality of demand (by the
public and the banking system) and supply of Monetary Base, the two
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equilibrium conditions are independent. In what follows we use the TJlM
equilibrium condition:
(4) fm (p, i, rt, y)W = Df(w,y) - LSMB
substituting (lb) and (2) in (4) gives (4a).
(4a) fUM(p, i, r TD y)W = fDf(w,y) - b(P,rL)(l - p)f P i, r TD y)W
The real sector part will be kept as simple as possible, to
highlight the portfolio aspects of the issue; a more extended analysis follows
in Section 3. All we do now is postulate a simDle fixed price Keynesian
output mechanism:
(5) y = A(i - p, y) Ai < 0, 0 < Ay < 1
(5) gives the traditional downward sloping IS curve after differentiation: 1/
di ~ (I-A )
(6) dy A <I 
Differentiation of (4a) gives us the locus describing asset market
equilibrium (labeled LM-curve in Figure 1).
1/ Note that in this section inflation p is still exogenous. p will be
-endogenized" in Section 3.
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Lt'
Figure 1
dii |(f + b(l - p)f T)W -(7) dyi fy
-|LM (f  M + b(l - p)fTD) w
(+) (-)
Two of the 3 terms in the numerator are negative, one is positive. But the
consistency conditions (la) allow us to resolve the ambiguity:
fMM + b(l - p)f = fUMM + fTD (1 - b + pb)fTD
y y y y y
fC (1 - b + pb)fTD < O
y y
Therefore (fy + b(l _ p)fT,)W _ < 
y y ifyve
holds, so the numerator is always negative.
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A similar analysis shows that the denominator is positive:
TiMM TD UMM TDI
fi + b(l - i f + fi (1 - b + pb) f
C ~~~~TD
= - fi - (1 -b + pb)fT >0
Taking all this together gives
(8) di >0 or an upward sloping LM curve.
IT'-LM
Let us now analyze what happens when regulated interest rates are
changed. First the time deposit rate.
Clearly rTD has not direct impact on the goods market, so the IS
curves does not move. A change (say an increase) does however change the
asset portfolio people are willing to hold, as assetholders will move out of
currency and curb market loans into time deposits. The impact of this change
on asset market equilibrium can be read from equation (4a):
(fUMM + b(1 _ p)fTD
di rTD) TD
dr |T- (fumm + b(I-p)ff TDTfy = y + (1p)i 
LM
(1 - b + pb)f r - b(1 - p)fC 
rTD TD >
fc + (1 - b + bp)fT< 0
1 
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The direction of the shift of LM, and via that the impact of the
change of the time deposit rate on economic activity, will depend on the
relative sensitivity of the demand for the two alternative assets (currency
and curb market loans) to changes in time deposit rates:
/011/
. ,/ \ ~IS
Figure 2 
di
IfM djrT-D I- > r
fr Y=-Y <
(10) +C<1&lp and L
rTD dy > 
T7 <
The int.uition behind the algebra is quite simple. consider the case that
people shift mainly out of curb market loans after a rise in the time deposit
rates (f Ur /fr > l-b(I-p) In this case the total supply of funds to the
r TD rTD 1-b(I-pI - (
business sectot will decline as funds are shifted from the curb market which
provides one for one intermedaation (no reserve requirements) into the banking
system which provides only partial intermediation: partial because a fraction
is syphoned off into required and free reserves rather than passed on to
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firms. As a result, the curb market rate will increase and economic activity
will decrease (case I in figure 1). If the banking system also provides
complete intermediation (p = 0, b = 1 or zero required and free reserves) and
C
the shift comes out of the curb market only (f = 0), there will of course
rTD
be no net effect of drTD on economic activity as can be read from equation
(9).
fC di p = O, b = 1  dy =0
rTD TD Y=y TD
LM
In the opposite case, p = 1 , any shift out of the curb market into
time deposits will just lead to reserve accumulation by banks and will
therefore be contractionary: 1/
The opposite case (Case II) is the one where people mainly shift out
of currency into time deposits, not out of loans extending the curb market:
fumm
rTD b(l-p)
fC 1-b(l-p)
rTT
Currency is an unproductive asset, so any shift out of it into time deposits,
which are partially passed through the business sector by the banking system,
leads to greater supply offunds to the business sector, a fall in the curb
market rate and an increase in economic activity.
The upshot of all this is that to predict the implication of changes
in time deposit rates, one has to have some insight in the financial structure
of the economy. Specifically, one wants to known which asset is the closest
1/ See the following footnote for a qualification.
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substitute to time deposits, and whether that asset provides more intermedia-
tion than the banking system; also of relevance of course is whether the
banking system will be allowed to play its intermediary role or not. The
latter case could obtain when for example the banking system is constrained by
direct limits on total lending (equivalent to p = 1 on the margin in our
model). Then an increase in time deposit rates is always contractionary. 1/
Before we incorporate our analysis of this section in the full blown
model of Section 3, and look at LR effects, we will look at the effects of a
lending rate increase. Under the financial structure found in most LDCs, bank
lending rates will not have much impact on demand for credit. Official bank
credit is extended at below market rates, which makes non-price rationing of
bank credit unavoidable. All a change in the lending rate does in such a
case, given the volume of credit extended, is change the "scarcity premium" on
the rationed loans received by those privileged firms who managed to have
access to bank credit. This is however not the end of the story, the
qualification "given the volume of credit extended" is a non-trivial
restriction. The reason is that if the banking system is not operating under
a system of direct credit limits, an increase in the lending.rate will induce
3 b(p,rL)
banks to hold less free reserves and extend more loans ( a > 0) thus
increasing the volume of credit outstanding. This clearly has an expansionary
effect, may be a surprising result. Formally, we can see from (4a) that the
LM curve shifts to the right while the IS curve stays where it is:
1/ Unless people shift only out of currency (fUMM = 0) in which case
drTD > 0 is neutral when combined with no intermdediation by banks:
fumm =O, p=l, b =o di dy =0
rTDd dr TD dr TD y=y TD
LM
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LY'
/1,
A is
I
Figure 3
(1 )fTD a b(p,rL)
(11) di = TL < O
rL I Y -y fi + ( 1- b+ bp )fi
LM
and therefore that
(12) dY > rL
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Section 3
INTEREST RATE REFORM, INFLATION AND GROWTH
In this section we will extend the model in several directions to
analyse the effects of an interest rate reform on inflation and medium rnn
growth. Aggregate supply responses and inflation are introduced in the model
in Section 3.2. 3.3 puts everything in a medium run growth context by
incorporating capital accumulation, monetary dynamics (via the government
deficit and the BoP) and relative price movements over time.
3.2 Short term effects on inflation
The key characteristic of the aggregate supply and inflation story
presented below is the incorporation of the link between the financial sector
and the supply side of the economy via the credit financing of working
capital. Cavallo (3) was the first one to point to both the empirical
relevance of this transmission channel and the unorthodox result it leads to.
Via this channel higher real rates will reduce output; if this effect on
aggregate demand, restrictive monetary policy and accompanying high real rates
may actually push inflation up in the short run, rather than slow it down. In
our model credit is needed to finance labour costs, so that total labour costs
will depend on the real wage w, output y and the cost of credit, i - p : if
we use a Cobb-Douglas production function with share parameter a
LC = WYa KK(a-l) (l + i -p a > 1
LC labour costs in real terms
- 18 -
Firms determine output such that profits pY - LCp will be maximized, which
leads to the aggregate supply function -
(13) ~~a-I -(a-1) (^(13) 1 = aYa K(al)w(l + i - p)
a-i
= ay w(1 + i + p) y = Y/K
or output will decline if either the real wage or the real rate go up.
Transformation in "per unit of capital" variables is done in anticipation of
the extension into a growth model presented in Section 3.3. The real wage w
is fixed exogenously reflecting the assumption of a Lewis-type surplus labour
economy.
Aggregate demand for domestic goods, Ad, consists of foreign demand
(exports E), domestic consumption of domestic goods Cd, investment I and
government expenditure (which, for simplicity, is assumed to fall on domestic
goods only). World demand for "our" goods depends on the terms of trade
q = p/(ep* ; fixed capital formation I depends on the real rate i-p
and the profit rate, which in turn depends on Y and K given the real wage. We
will assume I to be homogenous of degree one in Y and K for later
convenience.
Finally, the share of consumption that falls on domestic goods
depends on the terms of trade q, while total consumption depends on the real
rate (incorporating the McKinnon hypothesis of a positive savings response to
1/ Capital letters are used here because the corresponding lower case
letters will be used to denote quantities "per unit of capital" in
3.3. So income per unit of capital becomes y = YK 1
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a higher real rate), 1/ real income corrected for capital losses on nominal
A
assets pMR, Yd = y - pMR 4nd wealth K + MR (capital plus the real value of
the monetary base MR). All this leads to an aggregate demand for domestic
goods Ad:
Ad = Cd(q, i-p, Y-pMR, K + MR) + I(i-p, Y, K) + E(q) + G
Finally, we assume the price level to be sticky, relative prices
change only gradually. The inflation rate however can change instantaneously
in respect to anticipated foreign inflation 1* or excess demand for domestic
goods:
(14) P * + X(Ad - y)
(14) also incorporates the assumption of fixed exchange rates. A micro-
economic rationale for equations like (14) is given in Barro (2) and
Sheshinsky and Weiss (9). Gradual price adjustment implies the possibility of
disequilibrium in the goods market. We ignore the implications this has for
the behaviour of the agents in this economy and make the simplifying
assumption that unsatisfied demand for domestic goods spills over into the
market for foreign goods leaving total expenditure unchanged, and vice versa
for the case of excess supply of domestic goods.
1/ The question of which real rate (curbmarket or the one on TDs) influences
savings propensities cannot be resolved within this model, because the
uncertainty that causes the different assets to be imperfect substitutes is
not explicitly incorporated here. Choosing the real time deposit rate rather
than the real curbmarket rate leaves the results unaffected however.
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The financial sector part of the model is left unchanged, with one
exception: firms now need to finance not only working capital Df but also
physical capital K. So asset market equilibrium is described by an equation
that is basically similar to (4a):
11mm TT)
(15) f (p,i,r TD,Y,MR + K) = K + Df(w,Y,K) - (1 - p)f (p,i,rTD,Y,MR + K)
or moving toward "per unit of capita" variables
UMM ', (_fTD A
(15a) f (p,i,rTD,y,mr+l) = l+Df(w,y,1) - (1p)f (P,i,rTT,y,mr + 1) 1,
We can now analyse the impact of an interest rate reform using
equations (13), (14) and (15). Equations (13) and (14) can be combined to get
what we labeled the IS curve in Figure 4. This locus describes the
interaction between the curb market rate i, output (per unit of capital now) y
and inflation p via the goods markets: /
(16) dp (1-Cdy - Iy + (Cd3 + I1)(1 + i - p)(a - 1) ydjy1 I + Xmr C
The denominator is of course always positive. The numerator however
cannot be signed unambiguously. If, in the short turn, supply effects of
1 (15) and (15a) also incorporate the simplifying assumption that banks hold
no free reserves: b # b(p, i) but b = 1 instead, ef equation (4a).
2/ UJse (13) to substitute out i in (14) and (16) comes out.
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tight credit policies via the working capital/curb market link (Cavallo-
effect) dominate the deflationary impact on aggregate demand of such policies,
the numerator is positive and our "IS-curve" slopes downward. This is the
case when tight credit policies lead to higher inflation and less output
initially, rather than lower inflation and less output as traditionally
assumed. The first case commands strong empirical evidence in the only two
cases where this Cavallo-effect was investigated at all (Cavallo (3) for
Argentina and
van Wijnbergen (14) for South Korea). In what follows we will assume that
this "Cavallo-effect" indeed dominates, so that l < n. By inspecting (13a)
and (14a) it can readily be seen that changes in rTD do not affect the goods
market directly, so that IS curves does not shift when rTD changes.
/XL
Figure 4
If one uses (13) to substitute out the curb market rate in (15) one
gets a locus describing financial marke;ts equilibrium (labeled the LM curve in
Figure 4):
fC +PfTD +D + (fC+ pf T ±)1i - P(-)_
(17) dp { y y fy i i
| LC T( C Ti)
ILM (fp +pfp + f i+pf j
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The LM curve slopes upward: Assume output y goes up. Higher output
y leads to more demand for loans (Dfy > 0) but on the other hand it also
increases the demand for money and so decreases the supply of loans on the
curb market. To get back towards equilibrium, the curb market rate i has to
go up, luring lenders back into the curb market and discouraging demand.
However, by assumption y went up which is only possible in the short run if
the real rate falls (equation (13)). Accordingly, p will have to go up
even more than the curb market rate leading to a positive slope of the LM
curve.
A change in the time deposit rate leads to shift in this LM curve in
the same way the LM-curve in Section 2 was affected (Figure 2 and surrounding
text, p. 9). If an increase in Time Deposit rates mainly leads to a shift out
of the curb market rather than out of cash, the interest rate on the curb
market will shoot up because the net supply of funds to firms is reduced
(banks soak up part of the influx as required reserves). This in turn will
lead to a reduction in output given the inflation rate: the LM curve shifts
to the left. In this case an increase in Time Deposit rates is not only
contractionary, it will also fuel inflation in the short run. What is going
on here the following: if TDs are closer substitutes to curb market loans
than to cash, higher TD rates will lead to an increase in the real rate, as
well also argued in Section 2. This in turn will reduce supply (because of
the higher real cost of credit), and, under our assumption of the predominance
of the Cavallo-effect, will do so more than it reduces aggregate demand.
- 23 -
Accordingly, inflation will accelerate in the short run (see point A in Figure
4).
If however higher TD rates result mainly in a shift out of cash
(into TDs) rather than out of curb market loans, the net supply of funds to
firms will go up because banks will pass at least part of the deposits they
receive on to firms, while currency is an "unproductive" asset. This will
lead to a lower curb market rate and accordingly to higher output: the LM
curve shifts to the right in this case (Figure 4). In the new equilibrium (B,
Figure 4) the real rate will have gone down, output will have gone up and
inflation will in fact slow down (see point B in Figure 4) because of the
reduction of inflationary pressure brought about by the increase in aggregate
supply. As we noted in the introduction, this case, where the shift into Time
Deposits comes out of an "unproductive" asset, is really the one underlying
the McKinnon/Shaw/Kapur analysis.
A final point to note is that in the contractionary case the real
rate i - p will go up and output (and profits, given the real wage) down in
the short run. Clearly, the growth rate I = I = I(i-p, y, 1) will fall in
that case, which brings us to the subject of the next section, the effects on
financial deepening and growth in the medium run.
Long run effects on financial deepening and growth
Although the short run problems discussed in the previous sections
are of crucial importance for any policy maker considering the implementation
of an interest rate reform, the real issue is the medium to long run effect on
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financial deepening, savings and growth. It is to that question that we will
turn our attention now. In what follows we will discuss these questions using
the model set up in Section 3.2 and the associated dynamic equations. The
time span considered is called the "medium run" because we do not require net
capital accumulation per capita to stop in the steady state; instead, we look
at the "medium run" in which capital will be accumulated at a constant
(endogenous) growth rate and in which all other real quantities grow at the
same rate ("balanced growth"). Similar techniques have been used before by
Sargent (7), Pyle and Turnovsky (6) and Taylor (10).
The crucial variables are the terms of trade q, the growth rate
II = , and our indicator of financial deepening, mr, the real value of the
monetary base MR divided by the physical capital stock K: mr = MR/K.
The terms of trade q will change gradually over time if foreign and
domestic inflation rates differ (note our assumption of fixed exchange rates):
(18) q p
In the absence of private capital inflows changes in the monetary
base MR originates in the government deficit G and the current account, minus
inflationary erosion pMR .
R =C + Y - C - I - C -p MR
government current account Inflationary
deficit surplus (=income erosion
minus expend.)
Also, ifir = - - mr K so that the financial deepening indicator mr(=MR/K)
K K
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evolves over time according to (19):
C Y cT I G A MR -IA
Kr = K+ I K P I -mr K = Y - p mr - cT - (1 + mr)I
(19) = y cT - (1 + mr)I
where yD denotes disposable income (YD= y - p mr) and lower case letters
indicate variables per unit of capital (y = y/K etc.). Our system is rounded
out by the growth rate equation n = K-
K
(20) I (i-p, Y, K)
K
= I(i-p, y, 1)
The dynamic system is block triangular in q and mr versus n: the
evolution of q and mr can be determined from (19) and (20), independent from n.
Before we can analyze (19) and (2) however, we have .o express the
"short run variables" y, i, and p as functions of the state variables q
and mr and the policy variable rTD: 1/
y = y(q, mr; rTD)
- + +
(21) p = p (q, mr; r )
- +
i = i (q, mr; rTD)
-+
1/ An appendix containing the exact analytical expressions is available
on request.
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The ambiguity of yTD irTD and PrTD has been discussed extensively in the
previous section. The sign of Pmr is uncertain too: the credit/supply-
side link via working capital (Cavallo-effect) would tend to slow inflation
down immediately after a one shot increase in the Monetary Base (given the
capital stock), but wealth effects on spending may reverse this effect. In
our diagrammatical exposition we will assume that the first effect dominates
so Pmr <0; it can however be shown that this does not affect any of the
results. The signs of the other partial derivatives are fairly self-
evident. (21) can be used to link the growth rate to the state variables
(substitute (21) in (20):
(20a) n = n(q, mr; rTD)
-+ +
A loss in competitiveness reduces profitability and therefore investment and
medium run growth (a' < 0) while the impact effect of higher TD rates on
growth and investment is positive or negative depending on what happens to the
real rate i - p
Consider first equation (18):
q = p(q, mr; rTD) - *
The locus of q - mr combinations compatible with constant relative prices
( q = 0, RP in Figure 5) is downward sloping, given the signs of the partial
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derivatives we just discussed.
dq = _ 3p/3mr
dmr 3p/aq
An upward shift in q shifts world demand away from our goods which
will slow down inflation in the short run (ap < 0); this can be offset by a
decrease in the monetary base (per unit of capital), as this causes inflation
to flare up again in the short run due to the higher real cost of credit
(Cavallo-effect). Accordingly, the RP curve has a negative slope.
In the case where higher TD rates are contractionary, the RP curve
would shift upwards in reponse to a higher TT) rate: the higher TD rate would
raise the real curb market rate which in turn would push up inflation via
Cavallo-effects. This could be offset by an upward shift in q (a decrease in
competitiveness) because that would shift world demand away and so reduce
inflationary pressure. So the RP curve shifts up after an increase in TD
rates.
The AA locus gives those combinations of q and mr that are
compatible with constant monetary base/physical capital ratio mr.
Crucial both for the slope of the curve and for the direction in
which it shifts after an increase in rTD is the question of the impact effect
of a real rate increase on financial deepening mr. An increase in the real
rate i - p will slow down investment. The issue is whether it will also
alow down financial asset accumulation (which, given the government deficit,
can only change via changes in the current account) and if so whether it will
do so more than it slows down capital accumulation. On the one hand it will
increase financial asset accumulation because a higher real rate leads to a
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higher savings rate. On the other hand a higher real rate leads to a lower
real income via Cavallo-effects and may so decrease savings the higher savings
rate not withstanding. Tf the latter effect is strong enough, mr could
actually decline. Consider first the tatter case, with the income effect
dominating.
An increase in mr will lower the real rate and so increase capital
accumulation. It will further decrease private saving both via wealth effects
and indirect effects via the real interest rate so on balance financial
deepening mr will slow down. This can, in the case under consideration, be
offset by a decrease in the terms of trade (increase in competitiveness,
dq < 0): this will lead to more aggregate supply and a lower real rate and
therefore to more financial deepening (mr) under the assumption of dominating
income effects and so bring us back on the AA-locus. The conclusion is that
in this case the AA locus slopes downward (Figure 5) -/
t i \c , N
Figure 5
1/ Stability requires that the RP-curve cuts the AA curve from below
(see Figure 5).
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Putting all this together, the long run effects become clear: the
initial decrease in financial deepening because of the higher curb market rate
persists over time and our indicator of "financial depth" mr declines in the
new steady state (point B in Figure 5). Also the initial outburst in
inflation caused by the higher real rate will lead to a permanent loss in
competitiveness (qB < qA) Figure 5). The effects of the steady state growth
rate n and on output per unit of capital are unambiguously negative as medium
run profits fall and the real rate rises (cf equation (20a), p. 21 and
equation (21)).
Although it is an empirical question whether the negative Cavallo-
effects of a higher real rate on output really dominate the positive effects
of a higher savings rate in the short run, it is worthwhile to point out that
there clearly is a distinct possibility that higher time deposit rates will
lead to less rather than more financial depth (a lower mr) and lower growth in
the medium run.
Consider finally the case where these negative Cavallo-effects do
not dominate so that an increase in the real rate i- p indeed speeds up
financial deepening mr initially.
An increase in mr will still slow down financial deepening, but this
should now be offset by an increase in the terms of trade (decline of
competitiveness), because a decline would lower the real rate which would slow
financial deepening down further when Cavallo-effects do not dominate.
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Accordingly, the AA curve now slopes upward (see Figure 6).
I-N~  ~ ~
/C/
Figure 6
For the same reason the shift after an increase in time deposit
rates reverses sign: the higher real rate that results initially now improves
financial deepening so that the AA curve shifts to the right (a higher mr would
slow financial deepening down, bringing us back to the AA curve). The long
run effects are now more in line with the McKinnon/Shaw analysis (see B in
Figure 6). With the savings rate effects dominating the increase in financial
deepening sticks and mr goes up in the long run. The initial outburst of
inflation and accompanying decline in competitiveness will be reversed later
on under the combined impact of lower world demand and higher domestic
savings; whether the initial position will be restored is not obvious
however: qC t qA (see Figure 6). Accordingly, the net effect on growth can
be either positive or negative: the financial deepening will stimulate
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growth, but this may be reversed if competitiveness is not restored
sufficiently. So even when the positive effect on the savings rate dominates
negative influences on financial deepening, negative consequences for output
(per unit of capital) and medium term growth cannot be excluded.
4. The Structure of Asset Preferences in Korea: Empirical Evidence
The Korean financial sector is dominated by the commercial banking
system and the curb market, the stock market has continued to play a minor
role. This implies that individuals can hold their wealth as currency, demand
or time deposits at "Deposit Money Banks" or DMB's (this is the phrase used in
Korean statistical publications) or as loans outstanding in the curb or
Unofficial Money Market (UMM). The latter option comes down to direct lending
to firms, bypassing the banking system.
The UMM is largely an urban phenomenon in Korea. In a survey done
by the Sogang university of Seoul, it was found that 79% of TJMM lending was to
the urban business sector, 7% to urban consumers and the remaining 14% -.o
rural households (the survey was undertaken in 1969). Kim (1976), from whom
this information is taken, does not provide information on sample design etc.,
so one should by careful in interpreting these data. Moreover he reports that
urban and rural credit markets are entirely separated. In what follows we
will confine our attention to the urban business sector.
In the same survey it was found that 75% of all firms responding had
some debts outstanding at the T1MM, while 10% had more than 50% of their debts
at the UMM. The importance of the UMM has been declining over time however,
since the interest rate reform in 1965 improved the functioning of financial
intermediaries, and with increasingly easy access to foreign capital
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markets. Nevertheless the T1MM continues to play an important role. For many
small firms the UN-1 is the only place to go when turned down by commercial
banks (which only happens to non-exporters, exporters have automatic access to
credit). In the same survey, 93% of the firms with T11M debts gave as the
reason for operating in the 1MIM the unavailability of (sufficient amounts of)
hank credit. It seems clear that, from the demand side, the T M4 is largely a
spillover phenomenon kept alive by the occurrence of credit rationing by
commercial banks, which have no control over their lending rates.
So much for the demand for UMM loans, but who supplies them? In the
Sogang university survey, 73% of the loans made to the urban business sector
came from "relatives and friends and professional money lenders" with the
latter taking up 33%. 7.3% came from "men of same trade" and the remaining
19.3% from "miscellaneous", including merchants. So only about 20% represents
trade credit. According to Kim (1976), professional money lenders are usually
middlemen acting for wealthy businessmen. These results seem to lend support
to the approach taken here, where I assume that, in the absence of significant
securities markets and an open market in interest bearing government debt,
individuals can hold their wealth as currency, demand and time deposits at the
banks, or engage in direct lending to the business sector via the UMM. This leads
to traditional portfolio allocation equations for the different M2-components,
with RUMM, RT1, CPI, income and wealth (M2 + LSTJMM) as arguments. 11/ 2/ The loan
1/ RUMM: nominal curb market rate; RTD: nominal time deposit rate; CPI:
CPI inflation (= minus the real rate of return on cash balances); LSTJMM:
volume of loans outstanding at the curb market; GNPKN: nominal GNP.
2/ Simple acounting shows that within the financial structure assumed here,
M42 + LSUMM equals the monetary base plus the value of the capital stick;
accordingly this is an appropriate definition of wealth.
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supply at the T JM can then be derived via the wealth constraint a private individual
faces. The empirical results (based on 2SLS estimates) for the TD demand
equation is given in equation 1:
(1) ln(-) = 0.36 - 0.89 ln(1 + RUTI) + 1.63 ln(I + RO0)
CP I 100 100
(1.71) (2.42) (4.08)
(0.91) (0.q8) (1.00)
- 0.38 ln(1 + CPI ) + 0.02 ln( GNPN) + 0.93 ln( T(-1)ino ~~CPI CPI(-l)
(3.51) (0.53) (42.4)
(1.00) (0.40) (1.00)
R2 = 0.997 p = 0.3 Estimation Period: 64-I/79-IV.
Reshuffling the variables to derive dependence on real rates of return of
course leaves the coefficients on the two interest rates unchanged, but results in a
negative coefficient for the real rate of return on currency (minus the CPI
inflation rate): the coefficient on ln(1 + CPI ) becomes + .36. See Table 1.
Table 1: Elasticity of Demand for Time Deposits
with Respect to the Real Rate of Return on:
------------------------------------------------------------------ __---------_
RUI4M -ln(l + CPI .8Alternative asset 1 (the curb market); (ln(1 + FOO)
Alternative asset 2 (currency) ; (-ln(1 + C-0j)) : -0.36
Itself (time deposits) ; (ln(1 + RT1) - ln(1 + CPT +1.63
i0t 100
Clearly, substitution between the curb market and time deposits Is of more
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importance than substitution between currency and time deposits. This is of crucial
importance for the analysis of the effect of time deposit rate changes on inflation
and economic activity. The fact that TD's are closer substitutes to curb market
loans than to MI, together with the absence of wealth effects on the demand for time
deposits (via which increased savings could have been channeled into TD's over
time), is a strong indication that the phenomenal increase in time deposits after
the interest rate reform in 1965 was caused by a switch from lending at the TUMI to
time deposits at DMB's by private asset holders, and not by additional savings as is
usually claimed.
The equation for MI showed no significant wealth or interest rate effects,
but a strong dependence on the own rate of return, minus the CPI inflation rate:
(2) ln(M)l 0.08 - 0.40 ln(I + xI) + 0.03 ln( GNPKN) + 0.97 ln ( M(1))
(0.81) (4.50) (0.50) (21.6)
(0.58) (1.00) (0.38) (1.00)
R2 = 0.998 Estimation Period: 64-I/79-IV.
Equations (1) and (2) imply a reasonable supply equation for loans
on the curb market via the wealth constraint, with positive dependence on its
own real rate of return, negative dependence on the real rate of return on the
two alternative assets (MI and Time Deposits) and a unit wealth elasticity.
This portfolio allocation model has been incorporated in a medium
sized econometric macro model of the Korean economy. The model structure and
the results of the econometric estimation have been presented extensively
elsewhere (van Wijnbergen (1982)). Here we will confine ourselves to a verbal
presentation of the model structure.
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In addition to the private portfolio model a simplified model of the
banking system and of some aspects of the corporate sector's financial
decisions has been constructed to complete the financial sector. Firms are
assumed to have a total loan demand for working capital related to variable
costs (wages and intermediate input prices) and aggregate output. They use a
Tobin type allocation model to decide on how much to finance from abroad (via
private capital inflows from the Eurodollar market) or from the curb market,
after they have used up all the bank loans available. These are extended at
below market clearing rate but, at least for non-exporting activities, in an
aggregate quantity fixed directly or indirectly by the Bank of Korea (BoK).
Indirect measures are such things as BoK credit to commercial banlks, reserve
requirements, etc. The assumption that non-exporters first exhaust available
bank credit makes sense given the subsidy element it contains. The case is
different for exporters. There were no effective quantity constraints on
short term loans (rediscounting facilities) to exporters in the period under
consideration, so they have no incentive to enter the curb market. This is
also the assumption made in the model.
The model of the aggregate banking sector incorporates a substantial
amount of institutional detail. DMB's can be subdivided into domestic
commercial banks and branch offices of foreign banks. Although the size of
the loan portfolio of foreign banks is relative small, there is an important
difference between them and Korean banks that warrants special attention:
their liability structure is entirely different, with inter-office loans from
abroad making tip roughly 60% of their sources of funds (in 1980). Foreign
sources provide only 2% of the total of funds available to domestic banks.
These inter-office loans sky rocketed after the creation of special swap
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arrangements, available to foreign banks only, under which foreign banks sell
foreign currency to the BoK under repurchase contracts. In the model
presented here we will treat inter-office loans from abroad separately from
other foreign borrowing by DMB's.
Inter-office loans to Korean branch offices by their parent banks
are determined in the portfolio allocation process of these parent banks.
This leads to an equation linking the volume of inter-office loans to the
total volume of loans made by foreign (mainly Japanese and U.S.) banks,
Korean, Japanese and IJ.S. interest rates and, in general, the expected rate of
devaluation of the Won versus the U.S. dollar and the Yen.
Borrowing abroad by domestic banks depends on domestic lending rates
and the costs of obtaining funds abroad: as long as the marginal cost of
borrowing abroad is less than the lending rate, the shock of foreign
liabilities should be increased. The costs of borrowing abroad depend on the
relevant Euro-dollar rate, a country-specific mark-up factor, and the cost of
obtaining government guarantees. These latter costs are assumed to be an
increasing function of the banks foreign liabilities. Further, there is
evidence (Kim (1976)), that the BoK encourages private banks and firms to
borrow abroad when the BoK's Net Foreign Assets (NFA) position is considered
tight. We tried to capture this by including the number of months of imports
that could be financed from the current NFA stock of the BoK as a proxy for
this effect. The appropriate scale variable in the equation is the net worth
of the DMB's, which we approximate by a time trend.
Other sources of ftinds are dominated by time and savings deposits
and, to a lesser extent, demarid deposits. These are covered in the section on
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private portfolio allocation. Finally the BoK is an important source of funds
(about 10% of total DMB liabilities is with respect to the BoK). BoK to DMB
lending is considered a policy instrument.
Then the assets side. Loans extended to non-exporters will depend
positively on the lending rate and beginning of period availability of funds
from depositors and the BoK. They will further depend negatively on the BoK
discount rate and reserve requirements, all standard results. Finally, the
loan supply to non-exporters will, in the absence of reserve requirements
against foreign liabilities, depend one for one on current foreign
liabilities, the other policy instrument in the hands of the DMB's here
considered. The final component of domestic credit is credit to exporters.
Commercial banks extend loans to exporters at subsidized rates, but can
rediscount 80% of them at the BoK, also at subsidized rates. There is no
quantity constraint on that rediscounting facility. Accordingly loans to
exports are demand determined.
The remaining two items on the asset side are required and free
reserves. Required reserves clearly follow from the liability structure.
Free reserves then become the residual item, dictated by the behavioral
equations specified above and the balance sheet constraint stating that total
liabilities are equal to total assets.
The basic structure of the real sector model is as follows. On the
supply side, we distinguish between two sectors, exporters and non-
exporters. The distinction is made mainly because the government (and the
government controlled banking system) follows radically different credit
policies with respect to these two groups. Exporters have basically unlimited
access to bank credit as subsidized rates, which non-exporters face higher
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rates and quantity constraints. The export sector is characterized by
monopolistic competition so that firms determine their output and prices
simultaneously subject to a downward sloping (foreign) demand curve, input
prices and prodtuction technology. The domestic sector, which has a much lower
degree of concentration as far as firm size is concerned, is assumed to price
its products following a simple mark up rule and also faces a downward sloping
demand curve (for the market as a whole), describing Korean's allocation of
their total expenditure over domestic and foreign goods. The output and
pricing decisions are based on a model of the firm that starts from the
assumption that primary costs (wages and costs of intermediate imports) are
financed via credit. This production model is also behind the intermediate
imports demand equation. The wage price sector is completed by an expectation
augmented Phillips curve.
5. The Simulation Exercises
To indicate the relevance of the phenomena discussed in the
introdtuction, I have run a number of simulations with the econometric model of
the Korean economy discussed in the previous section.
The variables singled out for presentation are first of all the
inflation rate and real output; then the current account to see whether
expenditure adjustment has also taken place; and finally investment to get
some idea of medium term costs.
I am presenting the results of three policy experiments. The first
is an increase in the time deposit rate while capital inflows and bank lending
are NOT restrained by direct ceilings. The experiment implemented is a 15
percentage point increase over actual levels, in the first quarter of 79 and
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sustained until the end of the simulation period, the 4th quarter of 1981.
In looking at the results the reader should keep in mind that a 15
percent increase (nearly a doubling of the rate) is an extremely drastic
policy measure.
The second experiment is set up to illustrate that the results are
much more contractionary if the banking system is prevented by direct credit
limits and capital controls to play its intermediary role. The same change in
time deposit rates if "fed" into a version of the model where capital controls
and direct credit limits are manipulated to hit the same credit and money
targets as were obtained in the absence of the change in the time deposit rate
increase.
The third experiment leaves the time deposit rate unchanged-dut
doubles the lending rate (adds 15 percentage points throughout the simulation
period).
The results of the first experiment are reported in Figures 1A-4A.
As can be read from the econometric results of the estimation of the portfolio
model, loans extended on the curb market are a closer substitute to time
deposits than cash (and demand deposits); the results conform to our
predictions for that case. Inflation shoots up in the quarter where the
(near) doubling of the rates hits, with (on an annualized basis) more than 20
percentage points. 2! This is clearly an impact effect, it dies out after 1
quarter. Curb market rates shoot up and stay high thoroughout the simulation
period, although inflation more or less returns to its base level after one
1/ The base level run does not pretend to approximate actual values in 79.
We used the version with an endogenous bank loan supply and capital flows,
while the Koreans switched to direct credit limits and capital controls in
79-I.
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quarter; accordingly real rates increase and output falls.
After an initial deterioration expenditure adjusts more than income,
so that the current account improves. Private investment falls initially when
the crunch hits, but on balance returns to its old level after the first few
quarters: on the one hand real interest rates are up, but so is the increase
in real credit extenAed via the banking system; this happens because the
influx of time deposits is partially passed through into capital via bank
loans.
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In the second experiment this is not allowed to happen, credit
limits are imposed throughout the period to keep nominal credit to the private
sector at its base level run values. Now the contractionary effects are much
more severe: funds are withdrawn from the curb market, and deposited at the
commercial banks, but banks are prevented from passing them on to firms by the
credit limits. The results for investment are therefore disastrous (Figure
4B).
Real output drops significantly and stays low throughout the period
(Figure 28). The initial impact on inflation is of course a lot bigger
(Figure 1B), but once again dies out quickly. Again expenditure adjusts
strongly, after a small initial deterioration, the deficit on the current
account improves dramatically. The upshot of all this is clear: combining
increases in time deposit rates with restrictive monetary policies, at least
within the asset market structure prevalent in Korea has stagflationary
consequences.
The final experiment feeds a different kinds of shock into the
economy, a 15 percentage point increase in the bank lending rate. At the
moment of implementation, this amounts to a doubling of the rate, a larger
shock than any ever implemented in Korea (although the increased bank lendig
rate is still nowhere near curb market rates). The results are quite
dramatic, partly because of a shift by banks from free reserves towards loans
reserves, increase in loans), but much more because of another mechanism,
capital inflows via the banking system. The higher lending rates make it much
more profitable for foreign banks to lend to their Korean branch offices, and for
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Korean banks to borrow at the eurodollar market. In our simulation, inter-
office loans from Japanese and American banks more than double after 3 years
of higher lending rates (in 81-TV these loans increase 102 percent compared to
the base level run), while eurodollar and other foreign liabilities of the
domestic commerc.ial banks nearly triple compared with the base level run over
the same 3 year period (an 269% increase!). All this is passed through into
bank loans one for one, which is the main explanation for the dramatic
results. The total supply of loans to the business sector increases
substantially, pushing down the curb market interest rate. Investment goes up
and stays high under the combined impact of lower curb market rates and
increased availability of commercial bank loans. The impact effect on
inflation is favourable because of lower real credit costs but dies out
quickly; output increases substantially, but so does expenditure leading to a
sustained deterioration in the current account (see Figures IC-4C).
Conclusions
In this paper we examined the likely impact of changes in bank
lending and deposit rates on economic activity, inflation and growth. The
results are to be contrasted with the Shaw/McKinnon/Kapur view of the world
(at least the LDC part of it); their point of view is, with some exaggeration,
that high time deposit rates, preferably positive in real terms, are a good
thing to establish in LDC's, a necessary precondition (and sufficient, one is
tempted to believe occasionally) for high growth. If short term effects of
higher rates are considered at all, they are believed to be favourable,
increasing output and reducing inflation.
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Our results seriously qualify these claims. Explicit consideration
of the portfolio shifts to be expected shows that whether an increase in time
deposits is expansionary or contractionary depends on whether Time Deposits
are close substitutes to "unproductive" assets providing no pass through into
capital, like cash, gold or commodity stocks, or to "productive" assets like
loans extended in the curb market. The importance of asset market structure
for the effect of monetary policy was stressed a long time ago of course by
James Tobin (11).
We then incorporated the Tobin-type analysis in a macro-model
incorporating the link between credit and the supply side of the economy via
the financing of working capital, a transmission channel shown to be of
importance in LDC's, that causes often unexpected responses to monetary
policy. The outcome of this analysis is that when time deposits rate
increases are contractionary, they will also accelerate inflation; if they are
contractionary, they are so because they lead to tight credit conditions as
people shift out of the curb market rather than cash. The resulting high real
costs of credit lead to an acceleration of inflation in the short run,
indicating that in this case increases in time deposit rates will have a
stagflationary impact, in sharp contrast to the results obtained by for
example Kapur (4). The crucial difference is the implicit assumption made by
Kapur, and for that matter by McKinnon (6), that time deposits only substitute
with cash or other "unprodtuctive" assets. In that case it is shown that
favourable short run effects on output and inflation indeed do obtain.
We then went on to analyse the effects on capital accumulation and
medium run growth. In the contractionary case, the initial outburst of
inflation after an increase in time deposit rates will lead to a loss of
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competitiveness, which, in itself, lowers the profit rate and therefore
investment and the medium run growth rate. Financial asset accumulation may
slowdown if the fall in income more than offsets the increase in the savings
rate; if this happens, the resulting "financial shallowing", to borrow Shaw's
phrase, will make slower growth inevitable, as it comes on top of the negative
effect of the loss of competitiveness. If however, the savings rate increase
dominates, financial deepening will result. The net effect on growth becomes
ambiguous in that case: the loss of competitiveness and the "financial
deepening" effect work at cross purposes. The important point to note is that
we showed there is a distinct possibility that the beneficial effects of a
higher savings rate after an increase in time deposits rate, will be thwarted
by the contractionary impact of the portfolio reallocation the higher TD rates
also cause.
We also looked at the effects of changes in bank lending rates.
With bank loans rationed because lending rates are invariably below market
clearing levels, there are no negative effects on demand for bank loans to be
expected after an increase in lending rates (although some firms may run into
cash flow problems). On the other hand banks will be induced to hold less
free reserves and borrow more abroad to be able to make more loans when
lending rates go up; therefore, the net effect is expansionary, maybe a
somewhat surprising result.
Finally, we demonstrated the relevance of these problems with some
simulation results obtained from a quarterly econometric model of the Korean
economy. Increases in Time Deposit rates were shown to be contractionary in
the short run there, because the portfolio shifts they lead to cause a
tightening of credit conditions and higher costs of financing working capital:
- 5i -
people shift out of the curb market rather than out of cash. The higher costs
of financing working capital also push up inflation in the first quarter after
the change, making the increse in TD rates stagflationary. This effect dies
oit qu.;ck'0i cwe,7er The persistence of the loss in output is shown to depend
on whether the commercial banks are allowed to play their intermediary role or
not: if credit limits prevent passing through into bank loans of the influx of
time deposits caused by the higher rates, substantial and persistent real
output losses and decreased private investment were shown to result.
- 52 -
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